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RACE, CARS AND CONSENT:
REEVALUATING NO-SUSPICION
CONSENT SEARCHES
EAMON KELLY*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the wake of racial profiling studies finding that consent
searches are disproportionately used on minority drivers, civil
rights leaders across the country are calling for an end to con-
sent searches during routine traffic stops., Consent searches are
commonly used to investigate crime during traffic stops, but,
like all searches, impose significant inconvenience on drivers.
The burden of such searches, however, is not evenly distributed.
A statewide study of all traffic stops in Illinois reveals that in
2007, minority drivers were 2.5 times more likely than white
* Associate, Jenner & Block LLP; J.D., University of Illinois College of Law,
2008; B.A., University of Illinois-Urbana. This article is a product of the dedi-
cated work of political and community leaders, including then-State Senator
Barack Obama, who secured the passage of Illinois' racial profiling data col-
lection statute. On a personal note, I would like to thank the editorial staff of
the DePaul Journal for Social Justice for their work. I would also like to thank
Joseph Barber and Ben Hughes for their comments on earlier drafts of this
article, and Professor Andrew Leipold for his encouragement, comments,
and advice on this article. Finally, thank you to my wife, Lakshmi, for
everything.
I See, e.g., Stacey Anderson, Texas NAACP Moves to End Racial Profiling,
BET.coM, Mar. 23, 2005, http://www.bet.com/News/NewsArticleRaceln
AmericaRacialProfiling.htm (quoting Austin NAACP President Nelson Lin-
der as saying, "We oppose all consensual searches [because of racial profiling
concerns]") (last visited Feb. 16, 2009); Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties
Union of Ill. (ACLU of Ill.), Police Data Demonstrates Need for End of
Consent Searches in Illinois (July 2007), available at http://www.aclu-il.org/
news/press/2007/07/police-data demonstratesneed.shtml.
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drivers to be subjected to a consensual search.2 Yet, a consent
search of a minority driver in Illinois is half as likely to reveal
contraband: only 12.93% of consent searches of minority drivers
yield contraband, in comparison consent searches of white driv-
ers uncover contraband 24.6% of the time.3 Similar studies in
other states confirm that minorities are substantially more likely
to be consensually searched and that those searches are less
likely to disclose contraband. 4 This disproportionate targeting of
minority drivers calls for a reevaluation of the Fourth Amend-
ment standards applied to consent searches during traffic stops.
Currently, constitutional search-and-seizure jurisprudence
provides law enforcement with all but complete discretion to
conduct consent searches during traffic stops. Three constitu-
tional requirements determine if a consent search during a traf-
fic stop is valid. First, the traffic stop must be justified at its
inception by reasonable suspicion of some traffic violation.5
However, a reasonable basis for suspicion can be as minor as a
seat belt infraction, a missing headlight or a failure to signal.6
Second, the duration of the search must be appropriately brief
in light of the initial justification for the stop.7 But, because of-
ficers are authorized to request "consent" to extend the stop-
coupled with the wide latitude courts provide when evaluating
consensual extension-this limitation is weakened. Third, a
court must determine that the consent to search is given volun-
2 Nw UNIV. CTR. FOR PUB. SAFETY, ILL. TRAFFIC STOPS STATISTICS STUDY
2007 ANN. REP. 11 (2008) [hereinafter ILL. STUDY 2007].
3 Id.
4 See, e.g., COUNCIL ON CRIME & JUSTICE & INST. ON RACE & POVERTY,
MINNESOTA STATEWIDE RACIAL PROFILING REPORT: ALL PARTICIPATING
JURISDICTIONS 4 (2003) [hereinafter MINN. STUDY] (prepared for the Minne-
sota Legislature pursuant to MINN. STAT. § 626.951 (2003)); DEP'T. OF JUS-
TICE, CHARACTERISTICS OF DRIVERS STOPPED BY POLICE, 2002 2 (2006)
[hereinafter D.O.J. REPORT]; AMY FARRELL, ET AL., RHODE ISLAND TRAF-
FIC STOP STATISTICS ACT FINAL REPORT 14 (2003) [hereinafter R.I. STUDY].
5 Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
6 Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
7 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1968).
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tarily and is not the product of coercion. 8 Operating together,
however, these constitutional standards allow officers to use
purportedly consensual searches to target drivers even when
they lack any suspicion of criminal conduct specific to the driver.
In effect, this allows officers to conduct no-suspicion consent
searches in conjunction with routine stops for traffic violations.
The constitutional justification for each of the Supreme Court
rulings that individually permit no-suspicion consent searches
during routine traffic stops may be sound. However, as a whole,
coupled with lenient court determinations, serious concerns
arise.
Although consent searches can serve a useful purpose, the
reasonableness of using no-suspicion consent searches to target
drivers can be questioned for four reasons. First, these searches
result in a significant intrusion into the privacy of a driver
stopped for a routine traffic violation. This intrusion is greater,
particularly in terms of length, than the intrusion resulting from
other constitutionally permissible police tactics. Second, consent
searches are not an incidental burden imposed on all drivers;
rather, the burden is disproportionately imposed on minority
drivers. Third, when an officer lacks individualized suspicion,
the underlying policy interests that justify the permissive ap-
proach to consent searches are not implicated. Fourth, no-suspi-
cion searches are essentially random searches (at best) and are
only marginally effective when compared to other readily avail-
able and less-intrusive investigative tactics.
The failure of the current constitutional framework to address
these four concerns provides a convincing policy argument for
the application of a new, heightened standard for consent
searches that would require reasonable suspicion as a prerequi-
site to a valid consent search during a traffic stop. This height-
ened standard has been adopted by the judiciaries of several
8 See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 228 (1973) ("[T]he Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments require that a consent not be coerced, by ex-
plicit or implicit means .... ).
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states interpreting their own state constitutions.9 A reasonable
suspicion requirement is preferable for two reasons. First, it de-
creases the likelihood that innocent drivers will be targeted, be-
cause it constrains arbitrary decision making and prevents
searches based on subtle, unarticulatable bias. Second, as dis-
cussed below, requiring reasonable suspicion advances the pol-
icy justification relied on in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte for
promoting consent searches.
This article, however-like the state judiciaries that impose
reasonable suspicion requirements-does not question the effi-
cacy and constitutional reasonableness of all consent searches.
There are sound reasons for promoting some consent searches,
and most consent search scenarios can be distinguished from
traffic stops by two factors: (1) the suspicion basis for the re-
quest; and (2) the context of the request. When the context for
the initial request for the power to search is a criminal investiga-
tion, as opposed to traffic enforcement, the facts and circum-
stances of the suspected crime act to limit the scope of the police
investigation.
Further, imposing a reasonable suspicion requirement is an
effective response to the targeting of innocent minority drivers
for consent searches. Despite calls from civil rights groups for
the elimination of all consent searches based on the mounting
evidence of the disproportionate targeting of minority drivers,
consent searches should not be eliminated completely. If further
action to combat racial profiling is required, legislators should
consider policies that complement or reinforce a reasonable sus-
picion requirement. Ultimately, the reasonable suspicion ap-
proach best protects the rights of innocent drivers while
preserving the role of consent searches as a tool for police
officers.
9 See, e.g., State v. Fort, 660 N.W. 2d 415, 419 (Minn. 2003); State v. Carty,
790 A.2d 903, 912 (N.J. 2002).
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This article proceeds as follows. Part II explores the Supreme
Court's justifications for promoting consent searches. It also ex-
amines how the application of three constitutional search and
seizure analyses to consent searches facilitates no-suspicion con-
sent searches during traffic stops. Part III directs a critical eye at
no-suspicion consent searches, exploring four issues: (1) the in-
trusion consent searches impose on drivers; (2) the dispropor-
tionate impact of consent searches on minorities; (3) the failure
of consent searches to advance the policy justification that Jus-
tice Stewart articulated in Bustamonte as underlying the permis-
sive approach to consent searches; and (4) the ineffectiveness of
consent searches when the officer lacks reasonable suspicion.
Part IV argues that it is preferable to require officers to have
reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct before requesting con-
sent to search a car during a traffic stop, while maintaining con-
sent searches in other situations, such as criminal investigations.
Part IV concludes by discussing whether a reasonable suspicion
requirement goes far enough, and responds to the call to elimi-
nate consent searches.
II. CURRENT FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
APPLIED TO TRAFFIC STOPS
Current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence provides officers
broad discretion when conducting consent searches during traf-
fic stops. The rationale for the Supreme Court's permissive ap-
proach to consent searches was outlined in the landmark
decision Schneckloth v. Bustamonte.10 Since Bustamonte, the
Court has devised a framework for analyzing the Fourth
Amendment concerns raised by consent searches during traffic
stops that authorizes officers to conduct consent searches even
when they lack any suspicion of criminal conduct.
10 Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 228.
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A. Why are Courts so Deferential to Consent Searches?
Consent searches occupy a special place in Fourth Amend-
ment jurisprudence as an established exception to the warrant
requirement and the general requirement of particularized sus-
picion. Although searches pursuant to consent have always been
presumptively reasonable under the Constitution," the Court's
efforts to promote consent searches have gone beyond recogni-
tion of the exception. The Court has aggressively protected the
role of consent-based searches in police search practices by re-
jecting the argument that consent had to be made knowingly
and intelligently.12 In Bustamonte, Justice Stewart, writing for
the majority, explained the Court's unwillingness to apply a pro-
phylactic rule analogous to a Miranda warning to consensual
searches,13 and in the process, outlined the three best explana-
tions for the broad deference the Court grants to consent
searches.14
First, Bustamonte emphasizes the importance of consent
searches in the framework of suspicion-based searches. 15 Justice
Stewart observed, "[W]here the police have some evidence of
illicit activity, but lack probable cause to arrest or search, a
search authorized by a valid consent may be the only means of
obtaining important and reliable evidence."16 Justice Stewart did
11 See Northeastern Univ., Data Collection Resource Ctr., Background and
Current Data Collection Efforts: Introduction to Data Collection, http://
www.racialprofilinganalysis.neu.edu/background (last visited Feb. 15, 2009).
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 219 ("It is.. .well settled that one of the specifically
established exceptions to the requirements of both a warrant and probable
cause is a search that is conducted pursuant to consent.").
12 See id. at 231-33 (distinguishing Miranda warning); id. at 237 (distinguish-
ing "the requirement of a knowing and intelligent waiver... applied only to
those rights which the Constitution guarantees to a criminal defendant in or-
der to preserve a fair trial.").
13 See id. at 231-33.
14 See id. at 227-28.
15 Id. at 227.
16 Id.
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not defend consent searches as a tool to authorize randomized
searches of citizenry. Rather, he emphasized that consent
searches allow officers to investigate a crime when they have
some suspicion of criminal conduct, although not enough to con-
duct a probable-cause search.
Second, Justice Stewart argued that consent searches might
result in less inconvenience for the subject of the search. 17 If an
officer suspects wrongdoing, an innocent suspect might prefer to
dispel this suspicion rather than be detained. The opinion also
(reasonably) suggests that a suspect might view a consent search
as subjectively less intrusive into his or her privacy because of
the (at least theoretical) ability to deny consent. Justice Stew-
art's points of comparison, however, were nonconsensual
searches and continued detention. He was not, and could not,
rationally be arguing that a consent search is less intrusive than
no search.
Third, in supporting consent searches as an exception to stan-
dard Fourth Amendment requirements, Justice Stewart ex-
pressed concern about interfering with "standard investigatory
techniques."' 8 This third point appears to be a concession to the
importance and perceived effectiveness of consent searches.
In subsequent decisions, based on the Bustamonte policy ra-
tionale, the Supreme Court has constructed a framework that
provides broad discretion to officers to utilize consent searches
during traffic stops.
B. Constitutional Basis for Extending Traffic Stops
Formally, judicial review of the validity of a consent search
conducted during a traffic stop requires three substantive Fourth
Amendment inquiries to protect the rights of drivers. These in-
quiries may appear to provide substantive restrictions on the use
17 Id. at 228.
18 Id. at 231.
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of consent searches during traffic stops. In practice, however,
courts provide officers wide latitude to stop drivers and request
consent to search.
First, a court must determine if the traffic stop is justified at its
inception by reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation. 19 How-
ever, the reason for the stop does not need to be related to the
object of the search, thereby vastly expanding the officer's dis-
cretion when requesting consent. 20 Second, the duration of the
search must be appropriately brief in light of the initial justifica-
tion for the stop.21 Yet, by authorizing the officer to request con-
sent to extend the stop, and in light of the wide latitude courts
provide when evaluating consensual extension, this limitation is
virtually eliminated. Third, a court must determine that the con-
sent to search is given voluntarily and is not the product of coer-
cion.2 However, the Supreme Court has consistently rejected
judicial efforts to diminish the coercive impact of police author-
ity when they request consent to search. This framework pro-
vides law enforcement with virtually complete discretion,
allowing officers to conduct no-suspicion consent searches in
conjunction with routine traffic stops.
1. "Reasonable" Justification Required to
Make a Traffic Stop
A constitutionally valid traffic stop, in theory, requires only
reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation. Thus, an officer can
conduct a consent search for drugs during a traffic stop based
merely on suspicion of a technical traffic violation.23 Further, the
subjective intent of the officer is irrelevant. If the officer has
19 Prouse, 440 U.S. at 648.
20 Whren, 517 U.S. at 806.
21 Terry, 392 U.S. at 20.
22 See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 228 ("[T]he Fourth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments require that a consent not be coerced, by explicit or implicit
means. .. ").
23 Prouse, 440 U.S. at 648.
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probable cause to believe that a traffic violation occurred, the
officer can stop the driver, even if the traffic violation is not the
actual subjective reason for the stop.24 This construction autho-
rizes an officer to stop a driver for the purpose of conducting a
consent search without reasonable suspicion of criminal
conduct.
2. Illusory Terry Limitations on the Scope of
Traffic Stops
Likewise, police conduct after initiating a traffic stop should
be constitutionally limited in duration based on the justification
for the stop. The temporal limitations are the product of limita-
tions placed on temporary seizure under Terry and its progeny,
with some modifications. Officers can, however, avoid these lim-
itations by requesting consent to extend the stop even if they
lack any suspicion that the driver engaged in criminal conduct.
The Supreme Court has developed a test for analyzing the valid-
ity of a suspect's consent to this extended seizure, but in prac-
tice, courts are very lenient in this analysis.
Traffic stops are analyzed by applying, with modifications, the
limitations on the length of a stop developed in Terry v. Ohio
and its progeny.25 The constitutional limits on the scope of a
traditional Terry stop are a function of both the length of deten-
24 Whren, 517 U.S. at 813.
25 The extension of the Terry analysis to traffic stops based on probable
cause (versus reasonable suspicion) has been in some doubt. Some courts
indicated that Terry limitations do not apply when the stop is based on proba-
ble cause, albeit probable cause for a traffic violation. See, e.g., United States
v. Childs, 277 F.3d 947, 950 (7th Cir. 2002) (en banc); Wayne R. LaFave, The
"Routine Traffic Stop" From Start to Finish: Too Much "Routine," Not
Enough Fourth Amendment, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1843, 1864 (2004) [hereinaf-
ter LaFave, The "Routine Traffic Stop"]. Illinois v. Caballes provides further
clarification: the majority applied a Terry-style analysis to the use of a drug
dog during a traffic stop, albeit without invoking Terry directly. 543 U.S. 405
(2005). See also Prouse, 440 U.S. at 653-54 (applying Terry reasonableness
standard).
Volume 2, Number 2p Spring 2009
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tion and the intrusion of the investigative method employed.26
However, in the traffic stop context, the length of the stop is
analyzed to the veritable exclusion of other factors.27 In Illinois
v. Caballes, the Supreme Court specifically rejected attempts by
some lower courts to craft a purpose-based restriction on the
use of criminal investigation tactics (e.g. drug dogs) during rou-
tine traffic stops. 28 Instead, the Court emphasized time
limitations.
An officer's conduct, however, may constitutionally exceed
the time limitations of a traffic stop if the driver consents to an
extension.29 When the extension is based on the driver's pur-
ported consent, the consent to extend the traffic stop (the
seizure) is distinct from the consent to conduct the search. 30 The
consent to seizure analysis is analyzed under the "free to termi-
nate" or "free-to-leave" standard explained in Florida v. Bos-
26 To be constitutionally permissible under Terry, an investigatory stop (such
as a traffic stop) must be both "justified at its inception and.., reasonably
related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the
first place." Terry, 392 U.S. at 20 (emphasis added); accord Florida v. Royer,
460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983) (holding that during a Terry-stop based on reasona-
ble suspicion "an investigative detention must be temporary and last not
longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop" and "the inves-
tigative methods employed should be the least intrusive methods reasonably
available to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion in a short period of time");
see also LaFave, The "Routine Traffic Stop," supra note 25, at 1863.
27 Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407-08 (indicating that "[w]e may assume" that "a
dog sniff that occur[s] during an unreasonably prolonged traffic stop" would
be unconstitutional).
28 Id. at 409-10 ("The legitimate expectation that information about per-
fectly lawful activity will remain private is categorically distinguishable from
respondent's hopes or expectations concerning the nondetection of contra-
band in the trunk of his car.").
29 United States v. Sanchez-Pena, 336 F.3d 431, 442-43 (5th Cir. 2003). If an
officer has reasonable suspicion that the driver has committed a crime, that
suspicion also justifies holding the driver. See, e.g., United States v. Foreman,
369 F.3d 776 (4th Cir. 2004); United States v. Hill, 195 F.3d 258, 270-73 (6th
Cir. 1999).
30 See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 436 (1991) (outlining the consent to
seizure analysis).
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tick.31 In Bostick, police officers boarded a bus as part of a drug
interdiction effort.32 Once on the bus, they focused on the de-
fendant, with no articulated basis, and asked him some ques-
tions.33 The officers then informed him they were narcotics
agents and asked him for consent to search his bag, where they
subsequently found drugs.34 Although the Supreme Court did
not determine whether there was an unconstitutional seizure, it
laid out "the crucial test" for determining if there was an uncon-
stitutional seizure: whether in the totality of the circumstances
"a reasonable person" would feel "at liberty to ignore the police
presence and go about his business."35
31 Id. The Bostick court rejected the "free-to-leave" standard where the per-
son is already confined on public transportation, focusing instead on whether
the passenger feels "free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise termi-
nate the encounter." Id. at 436. However, in the context of a traffic stop there
is no meaningful distinction between the two standards because the driver
terminates the encounter by leaving. Id.
32 Id. at 431. The officers were in uniform, carrying a weapon in a zipped
pouch. Id.
33 Id. at 431-32.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 437. "In applying the totality of the circumstances test [to traffic
stops], courts look to numerous factors including the time, place and purpose
of the encounter, the words used by the officer, the officer's tone of voice and
general demeanor, the officer's statements to others present during the en-
counter, the threatening presence of several officers, the potential display of
a weapon by the officer, and the physical touching by the police of the citi-
zen." United States v. Weaver, 282 F.3d 302, 310 (4th Cir. 2002). In addition,
"the retention of a citizen's identification or other personal property or ef-
fects is highly material under the totality of the circumstances analysis." Id.
See also WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURES, A TREATISE ON THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT § 9.3(g) (4th ed. 2004) [hereinafter LAFAVE, SEARCH
AND SEIZURES]. Whether the officer informed the suspect they were free to
decline their request to extend the stop is an additional factor. Ohio v. Robi-
nette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996). Some courts consider whether the officer specif-
ically asked permission to conduct further inquiry or merely launched into
additional questioning or investigative tactics. State v. Robinette, 685 N.E. 2d
762, 770-71 (Ohio 1997) (considering the officers questioning about drugs af-
ter the stop "without any break in the conversation" as a factor in concluding
that the stop was not consensual).
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Although the free-to-leave standard appears to provide sub-
stantive protection to drivers, reported opinions demonstrate
that this protection is illusory. United States v. Lattimore, an en
banc opinion from the Fourth Circuit, is an example.36 In Lat-
timore, the driver agreed to sign a consent form after the follow-
ing exchange:
Lattimore: Yeah, and I seen [on T.V.] where [sic]
they pulled a guy over, and they, you know, asked
him the same thing you're asking me-whether
they could search his car or not. And, um, what's
the difference? If you do or you don't, it's gonna
happen anyway, right?
Trooper: Not really. If you don't, I feel you're hid-
ing something. Therefore, I'll call a drug dog right
up the road to come down here and let him search
your car.
Lattimore: That's what I'm saying. It don't really
make no difference. 37
The court unconvincingly, and with little explanation, held that
"[t]he totality of the circumstances presented indicate that from
this point forward [the signing of the form] the encounter was
consensual." 38 How this detention could be considered consen-
sual is unclear. The officer made it clear that the driver would be
detained against his will if he did not "consent" to the extension.
The choices both involved a prolonged detention. Unfortu-
nately, this flimsy application of the "totality of the circum-
stances" analysis is not exceptional. 39
36 United States v. Lattimore, 87 F.3d 647 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
37. Id. at 649.
38 Id. at 653.
39 See, e.g., LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURES, supra note 35, at § 9.3(g); see
also Hill, 195 F.3d at 258 (holding an officer was permitted to extend a traffic
stop when the driver declined consent); United States v. Davis, 430 F.3d 345
(6th Cir. 2005) (holding an officer was permitted to extend a stop when the
suspect declined to offer consent for a search, although a second extension to
call a second drug dog was not permitted); Foreman, 369 F.3d at 776 (holding
Volume 2, Number 2 Spring 2009
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3. Voluntary Consent to a Search
As is common with the consent to seizure analysis, courts set
a relatively low bar for determining whether a driver consents to
a search. The nominal legal standard is that a search is sup-
ported by consent if the consent is voluntarily given and not a
product of coercion.40 Under Bustamonte, a search is valid if in
the totality of the circumstances a court finds "the consent was
in fact voluntarily given, and not the result of duress or coercion,
express or implied."41 In determining if consent is voluntary and
not coerced, courts are to consider both "the characteristics of
the accused and the details of the interrogation."42 In establish-
ing the standard, the Court rejected the argument that the police
must inform drivers that they can refuse consent before the
search is considered consensual.43
Scholarship questioning whether the consent standard actu-
ally results in voluntary consent, or is a mere formality, is legion.
Studies indicate that drivers rarely decline consent to search
their car.44 To explain this phenomenon, a number of scholars
cite social science research indicating that from a psychological
an officer was permitted to extend a traffic stop when the driver declined
consent); United States v. Douglas, 195 Fed. Appx. 780, 783 (10th Cir. 2006)
(same); United States v. Hardy, 855 F.2d 753 (10th Cir. 1988) (same).
40 Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248.
41 Id. at 248-49 (emphasis added). In Schneckloth, the Court provided an
often cited but non-exclusive list of factors that courts should consider when
assessing in "the totality of all the surrounding circumstances" if a search is
consensual. Id. at 226. Factors include the age, education and intelligence of
the accused; knowledge of the right to refuse consent; whether the accused
was informed of his constitutional rights; the length of detention; the "re-
peated and prolonged nature of the questioning"; and physical coercion. Id.
42 Id. at 226.
43 Id. at 248-49. The Court refused to extend the "knowing and intelligent
waiver" standard applied to various Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights be-
cause "the community has a real interest in encouraging consent." Id. at 243-
44.
44 Illya Lichtenberg, Miranda in Ohio: The Effects of Robinette on the "Vol-
untary" Waiver of Fourth Amendment Rights, 44 How. L.J. 349, 370 (2001).
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perspective, a person asked by the police to consent to a search
does not feel free to decline.45 This research has identified coer-
cion in situations that the courts claim are not coercive.46 De-
spite this evidence, the Supreme Court has continued to reject
lower court attempts to heighten the requirements for proving
consent.
For example, in Ohio v. Robinette the Court rejected a bright-
line "first-tell-then-ask" rule that required officers to inform
drivers they were free to go before asking for consent to
search.47 The Ohio Supreme Court attempted to fashion such a
rule on the premise that drivers, once stopped, do not "feel
free" to terminate an encounter with police until expressly au-
thorized to leave.48 Rejecting the heightened standard, the
Court instead reiterated its totality of the circumstances analy-
sis49-an analysis that fails to account for the coercive character
of a police request for consent-the Court has allowed officers
to rely on purported consent. 50
C. Conclusion
The three tests applied to determine if a consent search dur-
ing a traffic stop is valid may appear to protect drivers from ar-
bitrary intrusion. However, a review of decisions that apply the
45 Adrian J. Barrio, Note, Rethinking Schneckloth v. Bustamonte: Incorpo-
rating Obedience Theory into the Supreme Court's Conception of Voluntary
Consent, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 215, 233-40; see LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURES, supra note 35, at §8.2 ("police ... have increasingly come to rely
upon purported 'consents'."); Robert H. Whorf, Consent Searches Following
Routine Traffic Stops-The Troubled Jurisprudence of a Doomed Drug In-
terdiction Technique, 28 OHIo N.U. L. REV. 1, 18-19 (2001).
46 Barrio, supra note 45, at 233-40; see LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURES,
supra note 35, at §8.2; Whorf, supra note 45, at 18-19.
47 Robinette, 519 U.S. at 39-40.
48 Id. at 41 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
49 Id. at 39-40.
50 See LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURES, supra note 35, at §8.2 ("po-
lice ... have increasingly come to rely upon purported 'consents'.").
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tests leaves the distinct impression that courts are throwing the
fight.51 The apparent judicial bias in favor of validating consent
searches is not surprising. Judges almost exclusively review cases
in which drugs are found. When police officers, lacking articul-
able and individualized suspicion, conduct searches that yield
drugs, the officers must appear to have an uncanny ability to
identify contraband couriers. Courts are understandably leery of
interfering with this (perceived) ability. But for every one Afri-
can American or Latino driver in court, there may be nine that
were subjected to a search that failed to yield results.52 Further,
this false sense of effectiveness obscures other problems caused
by allowing consent searches when an officer has no suspicion
that a driver engaged in criminal conduct.
Il. WHAT IS WRONG WITH No-SUSPICION
CONSENT SEARCHES?
The permissive approach to no-suspicion consent searches
during traffic stops is problematic for four reasons. First, consent
searches significantly inconvenience innocent drivers. Second,
innocent minorities are disproportionately the target of this in-
trusion. Third, the principal justifications for permissively al-
lowing consent searches are less applicable in the context of no-
suspicion consent searches. Fourth, the marginal effectiveness of
no-suspicion searches does not justify the practice, which, in
terms of effectiveness, is analogous to random traffic stops.
Each of these four concerns-intrusiveness, disparate treatment,
lack of justification and ineffectiveness-highlight problems
51 See, e.g., Douglas, 195 Fed. Appx. at 783 (holding that officer was justified
in detaining a driver who refused to consent to a search, despite court's find-
ing that officer detained drivers for drug dog sniffs in "almost every case in
which consent to search is refused"); Lattimore, 87 F.3d at 649; Hardy, 855
F.2d at 753; LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURES, supra note 35, at § 9.3(g).
52 See MINN. STUDY, supra note 4, at 22 (The search "hit rate" was 11.17%
for African-American drivers and 9.08% for Latino drivers.).
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with the Supreme Court's sanction of no-suspicion consent
searches during traffic stops.
A. No-suspicion Consent Searches are Intrusive
The considerable inconvenience and intrusion that result from
consent searches are at the heart of the concerns about the im-
pact of these searches on innocent drivers. Consent searches are
time consuming. The government may argue that the length of
consent searches, and thus the intrusion, should be judged based
on the seconds it takes to ask for consent to search and not the
time it takes to conduct the search. This argument is unpersua-
sive because the intrusion occurs whether or not the driver
"consents" to a search. Once a police officer asks a driver for
consent to search a car, the stop is all but inevitably extended
for a significant period of time. If the driver declines consent,
the officer will almost always extend the stop anyway. There-
fore, regardless of whether or not the driver consents, officers
impose a significant burden on drivers simply by requesting
consent.
Consent searches are also significantly more intrusive than al-
ternative police tactics used during traffic stops. When consent
searches are employed during a stop they can be differentiated
from other common police practices, such as drug sniffs. Unlike
dog sniffs, consent searches inevitably extend the length of a
traffic stop. Although a dog sniff can, theoretically, be employed
in a way that does not extend a stop, it is unlikely that a consent
search can be conducted during the time usually required to ex-
ecute a traffic stop.5 3 If a drug dog is available during a stop, an
officer can deploy it without extending the time of the stop at
53 Whorf, supra note 45, at 18-19.
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all, or by only a de minimis period. 54 In contrast, a consent
search for drugs can last between 20 and 40 minutes.55
Further, focusing only on the time it takes to request consent
ignores the reality that drivers are detained regardless of
whether they consent to the search or not. First, as a practical
matter, drivers almost always consent to a search of their car. In
Illinois, more than 90% of drivers agreed to consent searches.
(Interestingly, there was no compelling difference between the
consent rates for Caucasian drivers, 91.45%, and minority driv-
ers, 90.31%).56 Similar consent rates were observed in other
studies.57 For example, one study of traffic stops in Ohio found
that more than 90% of drivers gave consent to search their car.58
Second, if drivers decline consent, the requesting officer gen-
erally becomes suspicious and relies on another justification to
detain the driver. Many reported cases reveal an admitted police
practice of extending stops involuntarily after a refusal.59 In two
recent cases, officers in Kansas and Virginia admitted they call
for a drug dog in "almost every case in which consent to search
54 Caballes, 543 U.S. at 405.
55 Whorf, supra note 45, at 19. Further, unlike drug dogs and questioning,
which can be employed during a traffic stop, consent searches are often con-
ducted after a traffic citation or warning has been issued. Id. at 2-3.
56 ILL. STUDY 2007, supra note 2, at 10.
57 For example, in State v. Carty the New Jersey Supreme Court cited a mon-
itoring report that indicated that more than ninety percent of drivers consent
to a search even after being warned they could decline consent. 790 A.2d. at
910-12. Four out of five drivers in the New Jersey study were innocent of any
wrongdoing. Id.
58 Lichtenberg, supra note 44, at 370.
59 See, e.g., Davis, 430 F.3d at 345 (holding that an officer was permitted to
extend a stop when the suspect declined to offer consent for a search al-
though a second extension to call a second drug dog was not permitted);
Foreman, 369 F.3d at 776; Hill, 195 F.3d at 258; Hardy, 855 F.2d at 753; Doug-
las, 195 Fed. Appx. at 783.
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is refused."60 Detaining a driver who refuses consent to search
his car while a drug dog arrives can significantly extend a stop.6 1
Drivers themselves are also aware that an extended detention
awaits them if they refuse to consent to a search of their car.62
Popular artist Jay-Z portrayed not only the prevalence of racial
profiling, but the common police practice of extended detention
if consent to a search is refused in his song, "99 Problems." 63
Further, at least one circuit has sanctioned this practice by up-
60 Douglas, 195 Fed. Appx. at 783; see also Foreman, 369 F.3d at 779 n.4 (The
officer admitted that he detains drivers who deny consent for a drug dog sniff
if he has reasonable suspicion.).
61 Hardy, 855 F.2d at 761 (upholding a fifty-minute delay while a drug dog
was called when the driver declined consent to search the car).
62 Recall in Lattimore that the "consenting" driver saw officers on TV detain
drivers whether or not they consented to searches. See, e.g., Lattimore, 87
F.3d at 649 ("Yeah, and I seen [on T.V.] where [sic] they pulled a guy over,
and they, you know, asked him the same thing you're asking me-whether
they could search his car or not. And, um, what's the difference? If you do or
you don't, it's gonna happen anyway, right?").
63 The song "99 Problems" on Jay-Z's "The Black Album," portrays an ex-
change between Jay-Z and an officer after being stopped for driving "fifty-
five in the fifty-four" miles an hour:
[Officer:] Son do you know why I'm stoppin' you for?
[Jay-Z:] Cause I'm young and I'm black and my hat's real
low?/ Or do I look like a mind reader sir I don't
know/ Am I under arrest or should I guess some mo'?
[Officer:] Well you was doin' fifty-five in the fifty-four;/ license
and registration and step out of the car/ are you car-
ryin' a weapon on you? I know a lot of you are
[Jay-Z:] I ain't steppin' out of sh** all my paper's legit
[Officer:] Well do you mind if I look around the car a little bit?
[Jay-Z:] Well my glove compartment is locked, so is the trunk
in the back/ And I know my rights, so you gon' need a
warrant for that
[Officer:] Aren't you sharp as a tack! You some type of lawyer
or somethin', somebody important or somethin'
[Jay-Z:] Nah, I ain't passed the bar, but I know a little bit/
Enough that you won't illegally search my sh**
[Officer:] Well we'll see how smart you are when the canine
comes
JAY-Z, 99 PROBLEMS (Def Jam Recordings 2003).
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holding a search based on consent granted under threat of dog
sniff if consent was declined. 64 The public awareness of the wide-
spread practice of detaining drivers who refuse consent-as well
as the judicial sanction of the practice-undermines the argu-
ment that the intrusion of consent searches should be measured
only by the time it takes to request consent. Once an officer
requests consent to search a car, the driver will all-but inevitably
be detained for a significant period of time.
B. No-suspicion Consent Searches Disproportionately
Target Innocent Minority Drivers
In light of the intrusion that results from a consensual search,
newly available evidence that innocent minorities are substan-
tially more likely to be subjected to such searches is particularly
64 Lattimore, 87 F.3d at 649. The court in Lattimore attempted, rather uncon-
vincingly, to recast its decision in terms of whether the driver "withdrew"
consent. 87 F.3d at 651. But, the court's rephrasing of its analysis does not
alter its ultimate decision to treat as consensual a search conducted under
threat of a drug dog search and after the driver asked, "What's the difference
... if I say yes or I say no." Id. at 649.
The Supreme Court has "consistently held that a refusal to cooperate,
without more, does not furnish the minimal level of objective justification
needed for a detention or a seizure." Bostick, 501 U.S. at 437 (emphasis ad-
ded). But this statement implies, or at least leaves open, whether officers can
consider the refusal. Some courts (and many police officers) appear to con-
sider refusal as a factor justifying an involuntary detention on the basis of
reasonable suspicion. See United States v. Goodwin, 449 F.3d 766, 768-69
(7th Cir. 2006) (finding that a train passenger's statement that he lost the key
to his bag and did not want it searched constituted "giving a suspicious an-
swer" to a request for consent to search. That, coupled with the fact he fit the
drug courier profile, "created a reasonable suspicion that the defendant's lug-
gage contained contraband"); Steven L. Chanenson, Get the Facts, Jack! Em-
pirical Research and the Changing Constitutional Landscape of Consent
Searches, 71 TENN. L. REV. 399, 410-17 (2004); see also United States v. Holt,
264 F.3d 1215, 1224 (10th Cir. 2001) ("The officer may not use the refusal to
answer as the basis for a more intrusive search, but the officer would cer-
tainly be permitted to use that information to justify prudent safety-related
measures."). Whatever the state of the jurisprudential debate, in practice, an
officer will probably extend the stop if consent is declined.
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disturbing. Although the Fourth Amendment protects the guilty
and innocent alike, 65 jurists often suggest that the principal focus
when considering the intrusion of a police-initiated traffic stop
should be placed on the experience of an innocent driver.66 Re-
cent racial profiling studies67 indicate that minorities, particu-
larly innocent minorities, are disproportionately subject to a
consensual search during a traffic stop.68 Yet, searches of minori-
65 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (prohibiting the introduction
of unconstitutionally seized evidence in criminal prosecutions); see also Min-
nesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 110 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("Fourth
Amendment protection, reversed for the innocent only, would have little
force in regulating police behavior toward either the innocent or the guilty.").
66 See Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 452 (1990) ("The 'fear
and surprise' to be considered are not the natural fear of one who has been
drinking over the prospect of being stopped at a sobriety checkpoint but,
rather, the fear and surprise engendered in law abiding motorists by the na-
ture of the stop."); Bostick, 501 U.S. at 438 ("the 'reasonable person' test
presupposes an innocent person"); see also Royer, 460 U.S. at 519 n.4 (1983)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("[T]he potential intrusiveness of the officers' con-
duct must be judged from the viewpoint of an innocent person in [his]
position").
67 A number of reports on racial profiling and traffic stops are available as a
result of new data collected pursuant to state laws requiring police to identify
the race of the driver and police tactics used during all traffic stops. Racial
profiling data collections began in the late 1990s as jurisdictions began to
track information about police stops, searches, tickets and arrests in response
to increased focus on racial profiling. NORTHEASTERN UNIV., DATA COLLEC-
TION RESOURCE CTR., BACKGROUND AND CURRENT DATA COLLECTION EF-
FORTS: INTRODUCTION TO DATA COLLECTION, http://www.racialprofiling
analysis.neu.edu/background (last visited Feb. 15, 2009). Increasingly, state
legislatures are adopting laws requiring police departments to collect and re-
port racial profiling data as a method of curbing the practice. See, e.g., Press
Release, Office of the Governor Rod Blagojevich, Gov. Blagojevich Signs
Bill to Extend Profiling Study as State Releases Second Annual Traffic Stop
Report (July 7, 2006), available at http://www.dot.il.gov/press/RacialProfile
Study05.pdf. Today more than twenty states collect and report this informa-
tion. NORTHEASTERN UNIV., DATA COLLECTION RESOURCE CTR., BACK-
GROUND AND CURRENT DATA COLLECTION EFFORTS: HISTORY OF
RACIAL PROFILING ANALYSIS, http://www.racialprofilinganalysis.neu.edu/
background/history.php (last visited Feb. 15, 2009).
68 ILL. STUDY 2007, supra note 2, at 9-11.
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ties are less likely to disclose contraband than searches of white
drivers 69
The 2007 Illinois Traffic Stops Statistics Study found that mi-
nority drivers in Illinois were substantially more likely to be sub-
ject to a consensual search when compared to white drivers.70
Minority drivers were 2.5 times as likely to be subject to this
kind of search.71 Although consent searches only occurred in a
small percentage of stops (1%), minorities were significantly
more likely to be subject to a consensual search. 72 The following
chart from the Illinois study summarized the result:
3-i
i L
'v 
-1,o s
W~ht Afr ca Ht~parnc Ai~n Native
Table 1: Percentage of Illinois Stops Resulting in a
Consent Search by Race73
According to the Illinois study, an African American driver
was three times as likely to be the subject of a consent search as
69 Id. at 11.
70 Id. at 10-11.
71 Id. at 11.
72 Id.
73 Id.
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a white driver.74 Likewise, a Latino driver was 2.4 times as likely
to be subject to a consent search as a white driver.75
Similarly, a study of Rhode Island data collected by the Racial
Profiling Data Collection Resource Center (Rhode Island
study) found the probability that a minority driver would be
searched during a traffic stop was significantly higher than that
of a white driver.76 This study found that the probability that an
officer conducted a search of a minority driver after a traffic
stop was twice that of a white driver, when controlling for other
characteristics77
In addition, the Illinois study, the Rhode Island study, and a
similar Minnesota study all found that searches of white drivers
were more likely to yield contraband than searches of minority
drivers.78 The Rhode Island study found that 23.5% of all
searches of white drivers revealed contraband. 79 Yet, Rhode Is-
land law enforcement officers only found contraband in 17.8%
of the searches of minority motorists.80 The Minnesota study
noted "disparities in discretionary search rates are particularly
troubling" because there was a lower probability that these dis-
cretionary searches would yield contraband.8 ' Overall, the Min-
nesota study found 24% of discretionary searches of whites
produced contraband compared to only 11% for African Ameri-
cans, 12% for Asian Americans and 9% for Latinos.82 In Illinois,
consent searches of minorities were half as likely to uncover
contraband as searches of whites. 8 3
74 Id. at 10.
75 Id.
76 R. I. STUDY, supra note 4, at 187.
77 Id.
78 ILL. STUDY 2007, supra note 2, at 9-11; R. I. STUDY, supra note 4, at 187;
MINN. STUDY, supra note 4, at 1.
79 R. I. STUDY, supra note 4, at 189.
80 Id.
81 MINN. STUDY, supra note 4, at 1 (emphasis added).
82 Id. at 22.
83 ILL. STUDY 2007, supra note 2, at 11.
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A national analysis conducted by the Department of Justice
(DOJ) projecting the characteristics of traffic stops confirms
these results. The DOJ report estimated that 10.2% of African
American drivers stopped by the police were searched and
11.4% of Latino drivers stopped were searched, in contrast only
3.5% of white drivers stopped by the police during a traffic
stop.84 The DOJ report also looked at the success rates of those
searches. 85 The DOJ report confirmed that searches of minori-
ties were less likely to result in arrest. The study estimated that
5.9% of African American drivers and 8.8% of Latino drivers
stopped by police were searched but not arrested, compared to
only 2.1% of whites.86
Together, these studies disclose that the strikingly dispropor-
tionate burden of consent searches falls on innocent minority
drivers, further undermining the practice.
C. No-suspicion Consent Searches Do Not Promote
Interests Justifying Consent Searches
It is also important to consider how no-suspicion consent
searches measure up to the three justifications laid down by Jus-
tice Stewart for promoting consent searches. Only Justice Stew-
art's third rationale, fear of interfering with current police
practice, remains relevant as applied to no-suspicion consent
searches. His first and second justifications, a desire to promote
searches where there is some suspicion and a belief that they are
subjectively less intrusive, are not valid justifications for no-sus-
picion consent searches.
84 D.O.J. REPORT, supra note 4, at 1. Looking at specific subgroups, one out
of five (21.7%) young African American males stopped by police were
searched compared to a search rate of less than one out of ten (8.2%) for
young white males. Id. Young Latino males were searched in 16.8% of stops.
Id.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 7.
Volume 2, Number 2 .Spring 2009
ZT RACE, CARS AND CON.SENT
23
Kelly: Race, Cars and Consent: Reevaluating No-Suspicion Consent Searche
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
Consent searches have never been defended as a tool to au-
thorize randomized searches of the citizenry. Rather, as Justice
Stewart explained, consent searches are defended as a means of
allowing officers to investigate when they have some suspicion
not rising to the level that would otherwise authorize them to
conduct a search. 87 Allowing a search where there is some suspi-
cion facilitates criminal investigations and may be beneficial to
society because an officer's suspicion indicates a crime may be
in process. Ignoring that suspicion might allow a crime to pro-
ceed. However, when there is no particularized suspicion, there
is no benefit to society.
Justice Stewart also argued that consent searches result in less
inconvenience for the target of the search as compared to fur-
ther detention or suspicion.88 A driver may find it more conve-
nient to consent to a search if an officer suspects wrongdoing
because it may be preferable to dispel this suspicion. However,
this is not to say that the search is unintrusive. Rather, it is based
on the assumption that a consent search is less intrusive than a
nonconsensual search, or conversely, that the intrusion of a con-
sent search is preferable to continued police suspicion. If, how-
ever, the officer does not suspect the driver of wrongdoing, the
driver receives no personalized benefit, such as diminished sus-
picion, yet experiences the intrusion of a search. This search is
less convenient than the alternative of no search, which existed
before the officer requested consent to search.
It is also important to respond to the argument that the act of
giving consent to a search eliminates the significant subjective
intrusion that results when an innocent person is targeted for an
investigation and searched. 89 In addition to the physical intru-
87 Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227.
88 Id. at 228.
89 See United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 207 (2002):
In a society based on law, the concept of agreement and con-
sent should be given a weight and dignity of its own. Police
officers act in full accord with the law when they ask citizens
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sion resulting from detention, the subjective intrusion of being
targeted for investigation is substantial. 90 In Delaware v. Prouse,
Justice White acknowledged that being singled out for investiga-
tion by the side of the road "may create substantial anxiety."'9
Likewise, in Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, Chief
Justice Rehnquist observed that a driver's feeling of "fear and
surprise" is heightened when a driver does not see other vehi-
cles being stopped and investigated.92 During a consent search,
initiated when an officer lacks (and does not express) a justifica-
tion for the search, a driver inevitably feels this anxiety.
D. No-suspicion Consent Searches are an
Ineffective Strategy
In addition to other more fundamental concerns, the effec-
tiveness of no-suspicion consent searches should also be ques-
tioned. Recognizing the probability that the random stops are
ineffective, not to mention the substantial threat of abuse of
power that the Fourth Amendment was intended to guard
against, in Delaware v. Prouse, the Court found random license
and registration traffic stops to be unconstitutional. 93 Yet, a con-
sent search conducted after an officer stops a driver, interacts
with him, and still does not have suspicion specific to the driver,
for consent. It reinforces the rule of law for the citizen to advise
the police of his or her wishes and for the police to act in reli-
ance on that understanding. When this exchange takes place, it
dispels inferences of coercion.
Id.; Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 228 ("[A] search pursuant to consent may result
in considerably less inconvenience for the subject of the search, and, properly
conducted, is a constitutionally permissible and wholly legitimate aspect of
effective police activity.").
90 In defining the subjective dimension of an intrusion resulting from a traf-
fic stop, courts often focus on the extent to which the stop creates the percep-
tion in the innocent driver that he is being singled out. Sitz, 496 U.S. at
452-55.
91 Prouse, 440 U.S. at 657.
92 Sitz, 496 U.S. at 452-55.
93 Prouse, 440 U.S. at 661.
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can not be considered any different than a random search of all
drivers on the road.
The random traffic stops at issue in Prouse involved stops
where the officer lacked reasonable suspicion. In finding the
practice to be unconstitutional, the Court stated that the benefit
of the tactic was "marginal at best."94 Applying "common
sense," the Prouse Court reasoned that there was a low percent-
age of unlicensed drivers and therefore a large number of li-
censed drivers would need to be stopped in order to uncover an
unlicensed driver.95 The Court also pointed to a readily available
alternative: traffic stops "acting upon observed violations,"
which were more likely to uncover unlicensed drivers.96 After
reviewing the evidence, the Court found that "[i]n terms of actu-
ally discovering unlicensed drivers or deterring them from driv-
ing, the spot check does not appear sufficiently productive to
qualify as a reasonable law enforcement practice under the
Fourth Amendment." 97
The same failings that the Supreme Court found dispositive in
Prouse apply with even greater force to no-suspicion consent
searches. At the end of a traffic stop, the officer has observed
the driver, questioned him or her, and possibly used a drug dog.
It is unclear how extending a traffic stop without suspicion
under these circumstances could be any more effective than a
random traffic stop. If any credit is to be attributed to police
training, common sense suggests that extending the search is
probably less effective.
Not only is it likely less effective than random stops, because
a trained officer has been unable to detect evidence suggesting
criminal wrongdoing, but it threatens to erode the very notions
of privacy the Fourth Amendment was designed to protect.
94 Id. at 660.
95 Id. at 659-60.
96 Id. at 659.
97 Id. at 660.
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E. Conclusion
Ultimately, as some state courts acknowledge, the current
framework for analyzing consent searches fails to protect driv-
ers, particularly minority drivers, from significant intrusion by
police. 98 Further, justifications such as the benefit of dispelling
suspicion are illusory when an officer lacks any suspicion of the
driver. In addition, the effectiveness of no-suspicion searches
can be questioned in light of other available police techniques.
Together, these concerns call into question the efficiency of the
current Fourth Amendment framework for addressing no-suspi-
cion consent searches.
IV. ELIMINATING NO-SUSPICION CONSENT SEARCHES
In light of these failings, no-suspicion consent searches during
traffic stops should be eliminated. A number of state courts pro-
hibit no-suspicion consent searches during traffic stops, requir-
ing officers to have reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct
before conducting a consent search. This approach preserves the
benefit of searches based on reasonable suspicion, which do not
implicate the same concerns. In addition, no-suspicion traffic-
stop consent searches can be distinguished from other consent
search scenarios, thus imposing a heightened standard during
traffic stops would not undermine the validity of other consent
searches. Finally, requiring reasonable suspicion offers a sub-
stantive and effective response to the problem of targeting mi-
nority drivers. Other state and federal courts should follow the
lead of these states by requiring that officers conduct consent
searches during traffic stops only when they have reasonable
suspicion of criminal conduct.
98 See Fort, 660 N.W. 2d at 415; Carty, 790 A.2d at 903; see also People v.
Hollman, 590 N.E.2d 204, 210 (N.Y. 1992) (holding that to request consent to
search an officer must have a "founded suspicion that criminality is afoot").
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A. Several State Courts Impose Reasonable
Suspicion Requirements
Given the failure of constitutional jurisprudence to address
concerns with no-suspicion consent searches, a number of state
high courts are carving out new rules for consent searches dur-
ing traffic stops based on their state constitutions. 99 In State v.
Carty, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that reasonable sus-
picion of criminal wrongdoing is required before an officer can
seek consent to search a vehicle stopped for a lawful purpose. 100
The court noted:
The fact that the motorist already has been de-
tained at the point when an officer asks for con-
sent to search is not dispositive of whether a
suspicionless search should be allowed to con-
tinue. Because the motorist cannot leave the area
before the search is completed, unless it is termi-
nated earlier .... 101
The court adopted this requirement in light of social science and
statistical evidence that a "first-tell-then-ask" rule applied in
New Jersey was not yielding "truly voluntary searches."' 10 2
The Minnesota Supreme Court followed suit in State v. Fort,
holding that "in the absence of reasonable, articulable suspicion
a consent-based search obtained by exploitation of a routine
traffic stop that exceeds the scope of the stop's underlying justi-
99 See Fort, 660 N.W. 2d at 415 (finding that a passenger had been unconsti-
tutionally seized when subject to a consent search after routine traffic stop
because the police had no reasonable, articulatable suspicion.); Carty, 790
A.2d at 912 ("[U]nless there is a reasonable and articulatable basis beyond
the initial valid motor vehicle stop to continue the detention after completion
of the valid traffic stop, any further detention to effectuate a consent to
search is unconstitutional.").
100 Carty, 790 A.2d at 905.
101 Id. at 908.
102 Id. at 911-18.
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fication is invalid."103 This growing trend recognizes that drivers
are being involuntarily detained when there is no suspicion of
wrongdoing. Professor Wayne LaFave, a preeminent Fourth
Amendment scholar, provided a ringing endorsement of State v.
Fort, calling it "the best way to deal" with consent searches after
routine traffic stops.104
A reasonable suspicion requirement is preferable because it
appropriately balances the interests of the innocent driver and
the legitimate societal interest in effective criminal investiga-
tions. As these state court decisions implicitly acknowledge,
there are strong policy and practical reasons to encourage con-
sent searches provided an officer has reasonable suspicion that a
driver is engaged in criminal conduct. Searches based on reason-
able suspicion are exactly the type of beneficial search the Bus-
tamonte Court envisioned when it began defining the current
permissive approach to consent searches. As the Bustamonte
Court explained, "[W]here the police have some evidence of il-
licit activity, but lack probable cause to arrest or search, a search
authorized by a valid consent may be the only means of ob-
taining important and reliable evidence."105 A reasonable suspi-
cion requirement also protects innocent drivers from the
inconvenience of a consent search when the police lack ade-
quate justification. Importantly, as discussed below, requiring
reasonable suspicion as a precondition for conducting a consent
search also decreases the probability that the search will be used
against innocent minority drivers.
B. Requiring Reasonable Suspicion in the Traffic Stop
Context Does Not Undermine Other Consent Searches
This article does not argue that all consent searches should be
subject to the reasonable suspicion requirement. The four con-
103 Fort, 660 N.W. 2d at 416.
104 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURES, supra note 35, at §9.3(e).
105 Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227 (emphasis added).
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cerns discussed in Part III- intrusiveness, disparate treatment,
lack of justification and ineffectiveness-are not implicated in
most non-traffic stop circumstances where consent searches are
employed. First, in most non-traffic circumstances, the officer
initiates the stop based on reasonable suspicion of criminal con-
duct, before he or she asks for consent to search. Second, in the
other common consent search scenario not based on suspicion,
such as criminal investigations, the nature of the investigations
alleviates many of the concerns that arise in the traffic stop
context.
A consent search conducted when an officer on public patrol
stops a person based on suspicion of criminal conduct is the par-
adigmatic example of a beneficial consent search and is not sub-
ject to the criticism raised in Part III. These searches can be
distinguished from no-consent searches because reasonable sus-
picion is generally required to justify the initial stop and deten-
tion of a pedestrian. Reasonable suspicion acts to constrain
unfettered police discretion, thereby avoiding racial targeting.
Such searches are also the very type of search that the law of
consent seeks to promote: searches where an officer has a rea-
sonable suspicion of criminal conduct but not enough to require
a search.'0 6
Likewise, consent searches conducted during an ongoing
criminal investigation are not subject to the same criticism. Al-
though the officer may not suspect the subject of the search-
such as the mother, neighbor or friend of a victim-concerns
about arbitrary targeting are not implicated because the facts
and circumstances of the crime itself act to constrain the rational
targets of police investigations. Further, there is a clear public
interest in promoting these searches, consistent with the justifi-
cation outlined by Justice Stewart in Bustamonte to facilitate
criminal investigations.
106 Id.
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C. Will a Reasonable Suspicion Standard Do Enough to
Protect Innocent Minority Drivers from Unfair Targeting?
Given the extent of the targeting of innocent minorities for
consent searches, it is fair to ask whether a reasonable suspicion
standard goes far enough to address unfair targeting of minority
drivers. A reasonable suspicion requirement will undoubtedly
have some impact on the targeting of innocent minority drivers
for consent searches. However, relying on evidence from racial
profiling studies, several civil rights groups now advocate legisla-
tion prohibiting officers for requesting consent to search during
traffic stops. 10 7 This call for the complete elimination of consent
searches goes too far. Rather than eliminate consent searches,
policy makers concerned with the targeting of innocent minori-
ties should adopt a reasonable suspicion requirement and con-
sider strategies that compliment and reinforce such a standard.
A reasonable suspicion standard imposed on all consent
searches will decrease the impact of bias and thereby lesson the
burden placed on innocent minority drivers. As racial profiling
studies strip away faulty arguments used to justify the dispropor-
tionate use of consent searches on minorities-for example -
"minorities are more likely to consent" or "minorities are disad-
vantaged and thus are more likely to have contraband"-the
root cause of disproportionate targeting of minorities for con-
sent searches appears self-evident: racial bias.
This bias has the greatest impact where police are given the
broadest discretion. For example, although minority drivers are
still disproportionately targeted for reasonable-suspicion-based
decisions to initiate stops, the discrepancy is smaller than ob-
served with consent searches. In 2007, a minority driver in Illi-
nois was only 10% more likely than a white driver to be pulled
over, but was 150% more likely to be subjected to a consensual
107 See, e.g., Press Release, ACLU of Ill., Civil Rights Groups Ask Governor
Blagojevich to End Consent Searches by Illinois State Police (July 24, 2008),
available at http://www.aclu-il.org/news/press/2008/07.
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search.108 Imposing a reasonable suspicion requirement before a
police officer can ask for consent to search a car will limit police
discretion and thus should reduce the impact of bias on minority
drivers.
Several civil rights groups, however, argue for a more drastic
response-the complete elimination of consent searches. The
obvious advantage of eliminating consent searches is that it
eliminates the potential for the discriminatory decision making.
However, consent searches are an important police tool in prac-
tice and eliminating all searches risks throwing the baby out
with the bathwater. As Justice Stewart observed in Bustamonte,
"[W]here the police have some evidence of illicit activity, but
lack probable cause to arrest or search, a search authorized by a
valid consent may be the only means of obtaining important and
reliable evidence." 10 9 In Illinois, 17.6 % of consent searches re-
covered contraband. Put another way, 4283 of these searches re-
covered guns or drugs.110 Those 4283 investigations are not an
insignificant proportion of all successful criminal investigations;
by contrast, in 2005 a total of 94,125 felony criminal charges
were filed statewide.11 Given the value of consent searches in
police practices, a complete ban on consent searches is not the
most prudent response, despite the risk that bias will to some
extent continue to disproportionately impose the burden of car
searches on innocent minorities.
If a reasonable suspicion requirement proves to be an inade-
quate response-and it may well be-then further policy action
that complements and reinforces the reasonable suspicion re-
quirement should be considered. A complete review of such po-
tentially complementary policies is beyond the scope of this
108 ILL. STUDY 2007, supra note 2, at 5, 10. The study found that .64% of
white drivers are subjected to a consensual search compared to 1.64% of mi-
nority drivers. Id.
109 Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227.
110 ILL. STUDY 2007, supra note 2, at 10-11.
111 ILL. CRIMINAL JUSTICE AUTH., TRENDS AND ISSUES 2008: A PROFILE OF
CRIMINAL AND JUVENILE JUSTICE IN ILLINOIS: 1995-2005 77 (2008).
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article. However, the existing data-collection laws that have
been adopted in many states1 12 could facilitate measures to ad-
dress potential barriers to effective enforcement of a new rea-
sonable suspicion standard. For example, one barrier to
effective enforcement of a reasonable suspicion standard is the
lack of a means of policing the reasonable suspicion standard
where the driver is innocent. The vast majority of searches of
minority drivers targeted for consent searches, almost nine out
of ten, uncover no contraband. 113 Yet, the chief remedy for a
Fourth Amendment violation is suppression of incriminating ev-
idence, which is no remedy at all for the unjust search of an
innocent driver where no evidence was recovered. Further, the
absence of an effective deterrence for police who lack reasona-
ble suspicion and effective remedy for drivers could undermine
the effectiveness of the new standard.
One possible way, among many, to address this concern
would be to create a no-fault administrative complaint system,
which could provide drivers the ability to challenge the basis of
the officer's request to search and provide these drivers some
compensation for their injury without incurring large litigation
costs.1 1 4 Such a process could set a lower standard for establish-
112 See, e.g., 625 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/11-212 (2007).
113 ILL. STUDY 2007, supra note 2, at 11.
114 Congressman Conyers and Senator Feinstein have incorporated such an
administrative complaint provision in proposed legislation: The End Racial
Profiling Act of 2007, H.R. 4611, 110th Congress (2007); S. 2481, 110th Con-
gress (2007). Although the bill would not require all local departments to
adopt such a remedy, it requires some police departments to create an ad-
ministrative complaint procedure and remedy for racial profiling. Id. Two
technical concerns about such a system are: (1) the administrative burden
such a system imposes and (2) the cost of making such payments. An admin-
istrative remedy will only be effective if there is a mechanism for informing
the driver of his rights and documenting the circumstances of the stop. These
challenges are largely addressed in states that impose a data collection re-
quirement. For example, in Illinois, police officers are required to document
all traffic stops; requiring them to describe in a sentence or two the basis for
concluding that they had reasonable suspicion to request a traffic stop for
purposes of a future challenge to the stop. 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-212.
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ing a successful claim by avoiding the issue of police fault. This
administrative procedure would not require a showing of the of-
ficer's subjective state of mind.115 Such a system would have the
further benefit of shifting the cost of unjust targeting of innocent
minorities to the government. Payouts under such a system
would also provide a measure of the extent to which drivers are
unfairly targeted.11 6
A second potential barrier is the persistence of racial bias and
the likely continuing impact of race on officers as they deter-
mine if reasonable suspicion exists to request consent to search
a given driver. Although effective ways to resolve individual of-
ficer behavior may be elusive, where pockets of such targeting
persist, racial profiling data collection statutes could be used to
identify departments in need of corrective action. Before state
mandated reporting on the outcome of traffic stops, such infor-
mation was not feasibly available because of the lack of depart-
ment-specific evidence. For the first time, this information
makes it possible to identify districts which appear guilty of the
Further, as part of the stop, police could be required to provide the driver a
form for challenging the stop when no contraband is discovered. Officers reg-
ularly prepare warnings and tickets; a notice of the driver's right to challenge
the stop would be a minor additional inconvenience. The cost of the system
may not be as high as some would expect; for example, a payout of $100
every time a consent search of a car was conducted would only cost approxi-
mately $2.7 million dollars.
115 A determination that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion would still,
strictly speaking, require proof of the officer's fault-in the sense that the
officer lacked probable cause. Proof that the officer acted based on bias
would not be required.
116 In addition, a payout system would provide both hard data and a quanti-
fiable measure of the impact of police bias. Such a system could even be
combined with performance funding to police departments to create an in-
centive for decreasing the number of incidents. There are, however, two phil-
osophical problems with an administrative system. First, a modest payout
raises concerns that the payout may belittle the dignitary injury imposed by
the discriminatory treatment. Further, while a no-fault system would allow
for easier recoveries by the victims of unjustified traffic stops, it lacks the
punitive function of punishing the police officer who may have acted based
on bias.
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most extensive targeting and those that do not. This depart-
ment-specific data discloses a wide variability across local de-
partments in the rate at which minorities are subjected to traffic
stops. 117 Corrective action plans should require police depart-
ments engaging in the most excessive targeting of minorities to
include training programs, supervision and adoption of new de-
partment policies. This approach would complement and rein-
force a reasonable suspicion requirement.
Although further policy actions, perhaps along the lines dis-
cussed above, may ultimately be required to fully address the
targeting of innocent minority drivers, establishing a reasonable
suspicion requirement for initiating a consent search during a
traffic stop is an important, fundamental step towards alleviating
such targeting. Requiring reasonable suspicion to conduct con-
sent searches during traffic stops addresses concerns-intrusive-
ness, disparate treatment, lack of justification and
ineffectiveness-raised by the practice of conducting no-suspi-
cion consent searches.
V. CONCLUSION
Requiring officers to have reasonable suspicion before re-
questing consent to search a car may not eliminate the dispro-
portionate use of consent searches on innocent minorities, but it
holds promise for appropriately constraining police discretion
and serving the underlying policies of the Fourth Amendment.
This analysis refocuses on the intrusion of consent searches on
innocent drivers and the effectiveness of this tactic. Requiring
reasonable suspicion as a prerequisite to a consent search would
not unduly interfere with police interests, as it would reduce the
risk of police abuse of power and racial profiling, while increas-
ing the effectiveness of consent searches.
117 See, e.g., ILL. STUDY 2007, supra note 2.
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